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Accumulation  and Rental Behavior  in the
Market for Farmland
Robert G. Chambers and Tim T. Phipps
A farmer's  choices  of tenure and farm size result from a complex interplay of
economic factors, technology, entrepreneurial  ability, and personal preferences.  This
paper examines  the qualitative effects  of these factors on tenure and farm  size  in a
dynamic optimization  framework.  One implication  of the theoretical model is that
changes in technology should cause  systematic  differences  to be observed  between
rates  of return  on farmland and rates earned  on comparable  long-term  assets. This
implication  is supported by an  empirical  test.
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Many  postwar structural  changes  in U.S.  ag-
riculture,  such as the increase in average  farm
size  and the  decline  in the agricultural  labor
force, are well understood and at least partially
explained by technological  change. A less not-
ed, but  nonetheless  important,  development
has been the evolution of a farm tenure system
characterized  by  two  stylized  facts:  the  full-
owner operator has been displaced by the part-
owner operator  as  the dominant tenure  cate-
gory for  large  commercial farms  (table  1 and
figure  1);  and tenant  farming,  the traditional
entry point on the agricultural ladder,  has de-
clined greatly in importance. While the break-
down  of the tenant farming  system  has been
attributed (particularly in the South) to the in-
troduction  of labor-saving  technical  innova-
tion (Day),  the  switch  from  full-owner  oper-
ator to part-owner operator is less understood.
Two bodies  of literature  are most relevant
to this study:  the literature  on farmland price
determination and that on tenure choice. Most
farmland  price  studies  have  separated  land
price  determination  from the  choices of farm
Robert G. Chambers is a professor at the Department of Agricul-
tural and Resource  Economics,  University  of Maryland.  Tim T.
Phipps is a Fellow at the National Center for Food and Agricultural
Policy, Resources  for the Future.
This is Scientific Article No. A-4863,  Contribution No. 7894 of
the Maryland  Agricultural Experiment  Station.
The authors gratefully  acknowledge  comments from  R.  Lopez,
H. Shalit, an anonymous reviewer and the editors  as well as com-
puter support from the University of Maryland Computer Science
Center.
size and tenure  (Castle and Hoch,  Herdt and
Cochrane).  Some  studies  have  attempted  to
include  farm  size considerations  as  explana-
tory factors for land prices. Examples include
average  farm  size (Klinefelter),  the  change  in
average  farm  size (Reynolds  and  Timmons),
and the  stock of machinery,  a  proxy  for the
demand for farm enlargement  (Tweeten  and
Martin).  All  of these  models  were  basically
static in nature.
Three studies have examined farmland pric-
ing  in  a  dynamic  framework  (Burt,  Phipps,
Shalit and  Schmitz).  Burt assumed  the  stock
of land was  fixed,  so prices  were entirely  de-
mand determined. Choice of farm size and ten-
ure were not considered  in the theoretical  or
empirical  models.  In  his  theoretical  model
Phipps allowed the farmer to adjust land stock
but  assumed  the  stock  of land  was  fixed  in
the empirical model.  In addition, because the
theoretical  model  allowed instantaneous  ad-
justment, it was not capable of capturing truly
dynamic behavior. Shalit and Schmitz consid-
ered optimal land accumulation  when adjust-
ment of land  stocks  was  constrained  by the
flow of savings. Their empirical model focused
on  the  effects  of owner  equity  on  farmland
prices. None of these studies explored the joint
choices of farm  size and tenure.
Prior to World  War II,  much of the  farm
tenure literature involved study and testing of
the agricultural  ladder  concept.  The  agricul-
tural ladder was a hypothetical career path for
farmers, from farm laborer to tenant and even-
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Table  1.  Farm Tenure System
Operated  Land by Tenure
Full  Part owners Full
own-  Land  Land  Ten-  Man-
Year  ers  owned  rented  Total  ants  agers
.--------------------------------------  (%  total acres) --------------------------------------
1935  37  13  12  25  32  6
1940  36  13  15  28  29  7
1945  36  17  16  33  22  9
1950  36  21  16  37  18  9
1954  34  23  18  41  16  9
1959  31  25  20  45  14  10
1964  29  26  22  48  13  10
1969  35  28  24  52  13  NA
1974  35  28  25  53  12  NA
1978  33  29  26  55  12  NA
Source:  U.S. Census  of Agriculture.
tually to full-owner operator. By 1950, the con-
cept  was  discredited  as  being  an  unrealistic
view of the farm tenure process  (Barlowe and
Timmons). The more recent literature has con-
centrated on the effects of tenure on efficiency,
especially  the  relative  efficiency  of cash  and
share  rental  (Apland,  Barnes,  and  Justus;
Cheung; Stiglitz;  Sutinen). Garcia,  Sonka, and
Yoo  examined  the joint effects  of farm  size
and tenure  on farm  efficiency  in Illinois. The
authors did not address the choices by a farmer
of farm  size and tenure  because  land was as-
sumed to be  fixed and tenure  was exogenous
to the model.
This  paper  uses  a growth-theoretic  frame-
work to examine the choices of tenure and size
of operating unit. It is similar to the  study of
Shalit and Schmitz in that it assumes farmers
solve  an  intertemporal  utility  maximization
problem. However,  unlike Shalit and Schmitz,
the present approach recognizes explicitly that
farmers  receive  nonpecuniary  as  well  as  pe-
cuniary  benefits from  land ownership.  In the
Shalit and  Schmitz  study, utility was  yielded
only by consumption and the bequest of wealth
at the end of the planning period (savings em-
bodied in land).
Perhaps more importantly, the present study
also integrates  the  rental  decision  into  a dy-
namic optimization model. This development
yields a central contribution  of the  paper:  an
interpretation  of the  land-rental  market  as  a
temporary  equilibrium  mechanism  that  per-
mits farmers  to make  short-run  adjustments
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Figure  1.  Tenure of operator, 1978
manner that active markets for commodity in-
ventories  facilitate  short-run  commodity ad-
justments.
One implication of the theoretical  model is
that  changes  in technology  should  cause  sys-
tematic  differences  to  be  observed  between
rates  of return on farmland  and rates  earned
on comparable  long-term assets. An empirical
test, using time as a proxy for technical change,
provides support  for this implication.
The Model
Assume producers  face  a  technology summa-
rized by
T(z,  11  12,  0),
which is compact and convex. Here z is a vec-
tor  of net  outputs,  4i  is  land  owned  by  the
farmer,  12 is land rented (in or out) by the farmer
(/2  <  0 if the farmer rents out land and  12  > 0
if the farmer  rents  in  land),  and  0 is  a shift
indicator that will be interpreted variously  as
an index of managerial  ability and the state of
technology.  The  specification  of T  recognizes
that owned land and rented land need not be
perfect  substitutes  in  production.  There  are
numerous reasons for this: for example,  rented
land may not be geographically adjacent to the
farmer's operation,  and its utilization may re-
quire different practices by the farmer.  In ad-
dition,  as  hypothesized  by  Ciriacy-Wantrup,
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renters  may be  less  inclined  than  owners  to
make  long-term  land  improving  or  soil-con-
serving  investments,  such  as  leveling,  tile
drainage systems, or terracing.  Ervin has pro-
vided empirical  support  for this  hypothesis,
although another study (Dillman and Carlson)
was not supportive.  At any point in time, the
producer's income from a given level of owned
and  rented land  committed  to production  is
defined by
7r(l,,  1 2, v,  0) = max{v z  - 0(1 ,):zET(z,  , 12,  0)},
where v is an n-dimensional vector of net out-
put prices and 0 (.) is a strictly convex function
reflecting the  cost  of maintaining  the quality
of owned land. I  possesses the following prop-
erties:  convex in v, non-decreasing in v and a
generalized  version  of Hotelling's  lemma
(where the * indicates  optimal choice):
Z*  = 1,2,...,n. avi
It is also assumed that I  is twice-continuously
differentiable and exhibits strict concavity (di-
minishing marginal profitability) in both 11 and
12  while it is increasing in both  11  and  12.
Producers  maximize  the  present  value  of
utility,  where  instantaneous  utility  depends
upon  consumption  (c).  But at the same  time
we want to recognize  that farmers may derive
nonpecuniary  benefits  from  owning  land.
Hence,  instantaneous  utility is expressed
u(c,  li),
where u(.) is a twice-continuously  differentia-
ble and concave function of its arguments. We
also assume land ownership and consumption
are complementary  goods (02u/0cdl  >  0).  In
other words, farmers  may derive  utility from
owning land in addition  to the pecuniary  re-
muneration they receive from renting the land
or farming.  To presume  otherwise "does not
do justice to the magnetic  attraction of land"
(Currie,  p.  119).  In many societies, land own-
ership obviously confers psychic or status-good
benefits that are  quite  apart  from the purely
economic returns. This paper seeks to integrate
this notion into a framework that permits sci-
entific analysis of the tradeoff between psychic
returns  and  returns  that  are  purely  market
based. Hence, the incorporation of owned land
into the utility function.'
I An anonymous  reviewer suggested  that rental land  may also
confer psychic benefits by providing access to a farming lifestyle.
In this model farmers  have two alternative
means  of disbursing  their flow  income:  con-
sume it  directly  or  save  it.  All  saving  takes
place in the form of  land accumulation. Hence,
it  is  explicitly  assumed  that farmers  do  not
have access to financial  markets in what fol-
lows. This assumption  is made to streamline
the analysis. It is easy to demonstrate that the
central qualitative results of the paper are pre-
served  so long  as the farmer  does not face  a
perfect  financial  market,  that  is,  the  farmer
cannot borrow as much as desired at a constant
rate of interest.2 If a is the acquisition price of
land the total level of accumulated  savings is
all. The  rate of accumulation  obeys  the  fol-
lowing intertemporal budget constraint:
i,  =  [n(/l,  12, v,  ) - wl2  - c]/a,
where dots over variables denote  time deriv-
atives and  w is the rental price of land.
Over time  market prices  (v) as  well  as the
rental  and  the  acquisition  price  of land  will
vary. Most likely, it is unreasonable  to believe
that  any  farmer  will  know the complete  tra-
jectory of all such prices.  Therefore, it is nec-
essary to ignore this problem or to confront it
by  making  some  expectational  assumption.
Two assumptions  that are particularly tracta-
ble and popular in dynamic models are static
expectations  and a constant rate of growth in
all prices. In  dynamic models,  static expecta-
tions are often combined with the assumption
of continual  updating  as  new  information  is
acquired (Epstein). In such cases, although an
individual  plans an  entire  control  trajectory,
he only implements that part of the trajectory
corresponding to the current period. After new
information  becomes  available,  the  optimal
trajectory is revised  subject  to the constraint
that the new initial state value equals that im-
plied by previous decisions. A constant rate of
growth in prices means that v(t) = v(o)ebt is the
vector  of market  prices  in time  t where  b is
the growth rate. If this is the case, an individual
still gains by reformulating his optimal plan if
While this would  present an interesting  extension of our model,
we have chosen in this paper to restrict our attention to the non-
pencuniary  benefits associated  exclusively with land ownership.
2The assertion that our basic qualitative results would not change
with  imperfect credit markets can  be justified formally.  Suppose
that the rate at which an individual farmer borrows and the amount
that he borrows depend upon his net equity. If we denote all equity
in units of owned land,  then instantaneous profits-now  defined
as farm income less debt service-can still be expressed as a general
function of 1,. Although not the same as the current 7r(l/, 12, v, 0),
this new instantaneous profit function would have almost identical
properties and the analysis would proceed  accordingly.
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experience  teaches  him that all  prices do not
grow at this constant rate.
For the sake of clarify and ease of exposition,
we employ the static expectations assumption
with  continual  revision.  The  farmer's  inter-




Max  e-rtu(c,  l)  dt
C,  12
i1 =  [In(li,  12,  v,  0)  - w2 - c]/a;
,1  +  12 - 0;
/1(0) =  -1;
steady-state equilibrium,  the convergent  path
is optimal (Arrow and Kurz, p. 51). In the case






and direct integration assuming lim q(t) = q <
t-*oo
lanl
oo and  r >  (see below)  gives
q(t)=  ;exp [  - (  -al- r  l
J?~~  ~~l  -J  r\  d  n}-/  Jdt.
where r is the intertemporal discount  rate;  11
+  12  - 0 reflects the fact that an individual at
any point in time can never rent out more land
than he already owns. It is assumed 11  is always
nonnegative and finite.
Optimal Acquisition  and Rental Behavior
From (1),  form the constrained  current value
hamiltonian:
(2)  H = u(c, I,)  + q[II(/1,  12,  v, 0)  - wl  - c]/a
+  X(l  +  12),
where  q is the current  value co-state  variable
and X  is a lagrangian multiplier associated with
the rental  constraint.  Conditions  for an inte-
rior solution include
(3)  aH  a;uq ac  ac  a
aH  q[_  [  ]+X1
(4)  L  - w  +X=0; al2  a  a/2
(5)  aH  1 (11  12, V, @) dq
- w1 2 - c =  i;
H  au + q aI
(6)  all  al  a  +X
Ol,  =/  l-  a+ -9/
= rq - q; and
lim e-rTq()  = 0.
T-  oo (7)
Equations  (5)  and  (6)  portray  the  dynamic
properties of the optimal response system. The
concavity  of the hamiltonian  in c  and 1i and
the transversality condition (7) guarantee that
if  the  associated  q(t)  and  11(t)  converge  to a
Thus  q  is positive and  can be  interpreted  as
the  marginal  utility  of one unit  of land  dis-
counted to the  present.  In  turn, this  implies
that the ratio q/a can be interpreted much like
Tobin's  Q,  i.e.,  the  ratio  of the  discounted
stream of future benefits of an asset relative to
its acquisition  price.
By (3),  the farmer consumes up to the point
where the instantaneous  marginal utility from
consumption exactly  equals the gain that  can
be made by delaying consumption through the
acquisition  of land.  Moreover,  the concavity
of u in c implies that as (Q = q/a) rises, with
the  level  of 11 fixed,  consumption  must  fall.
But, of course,  this is quite intuitive  since  Q
can always be interpreted as the effective mar-
ginal  opportunity  cost  of consumption.  Any
funds invested  at time t in owned land priced
at a will effect  a return of q. Therefore, if the
marginal  utility  per dollar of consumption  is
less than  Q, the farmer is better off diverting
funds to the accumulation  of land.  Similarly,
an increase in l1,  keeping  Q constant, will en-
courage  current  consumption  since  as  /1  in-
creases the marginal utility derived from hold-
ing land decreases.





W  =  -'
q  Q'
The difference  between  the  marginal  prof-
itability  of hired land  and its rental  rate  will
always be nonpositive and equal to the shadow
price  of the rental  constraint  divided  by the
marginal benefit of another unit of owned land.
However, as long as the constraint is not bind-
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ing,  i.e.,  the  farmer does not rent  out  all his
land,
(8)  = Wd
i.e.,  the  marginal  profitability  of rental  land
equals  the rental price.  Perhaps the most im-
portant  thing  about  (8) is that  it  defines  an
implicit  equation for rental  demand.  As long
as II is twice differentiable and strictly concave
in  12  one can  solve (8)  to obtain
(9) 2 =  1 2(w,  v,  e,  1).
Equations (8) and (9) may be used to determine




- 8~  =  0  1  0.
Ow  dl2
Quite naturally, as the rental price of  land rises,
the farmer tends either to rent in less land or
to rent out  more land. Moreover,  for a  suffi-
ciently large rise in w, the farmer could switch
from being a farm operator to a landlord. Oth-
er factors that affect the net rental position are
discussed in more detail below.
Similar arguments  establish
(10)
*-  a2Io/ol2,ll
all  dn2II/d122  '
which,  in  general,  has  an  ambiguous  sign.
However,  the numerator of (10) can be inter-
preted as (p, t/81l), where p is the marginal prof-
itability of owned land in the farming opera-
tion.  If,  as  one  usually  expects,  owned  and
rented land  are close substitutes,  this expres-
sion would be negative,  which implies (10)  is
negative.  We assume this is the case.  Expres-
sions  (9)  and (10)  are also interesting because
they  provide  an  empirical  basis  for  testing
whether or not owned and rented land are per-
fect  substitutes.  If owned and rented land are
perfect  substitutes, expression  (10)  equals mi-
nus  one.  Accordingly,  one  can  test  the  hy-
pothesis of  perfect subsitutability by specifying
an appropriate form for (9) and then restricting
it in a manner such that expression (10) equals
minus one.  Standard  hypothesis testing  pro-
cedures are then available. It also follows that
al*  a2II/d1260
(11)  a  - 2/  ,and




2 /i avi  a2 I/dl22  -
If expression  (11)  is positive  (negative) and 0
is  taken as an  index  of technical  change,  we
shall refer to technical change  as being rental
land using (saving).
There  are  instances  where  the farmer  will
exit from farming  although he  may still own
land.  The farmer  will rent out all  his  land if
his technology is such that
an(/I, -l1, v,  O)
012
i.e., the farmer can earn more  by renting out
all  of his land than  he  can earn by devoting
the  same  land to farming.  Such  seems likely
to be the  case  for farmers  who operate in re-
gions where land has a high opportunity cost,
e.g.,  on  the periphery  of a large  city  or  the
classic case of the retired farmer who can earn
more by renting out  all of his or her land to
more productive farmers.
Temporary Equilibrium in the Land
Rental Market
The discussion surrounding equations (8)-(12)
suggests an interesting graphical interpretation
of the land-rental decision. Figure 2 represents
the short-run demand for rental land (9), given
an existing stock of owned land that cannot be
instantaneously augmented (i.e., it requires the
investment  of savings) and the other param-
eters of the decision  problem. As  long  as the
equality of (8) holds,  land rental  demand is a
decreasing function of the rental price of land.
Once  the  equality  does  not  hold,  there  is  a
corner  solution  and the  farmer  rents  out  the
entire land holding;  land rented out becomes
perfectly  inelastic  no matter what  rental  rate
prevails.
Figure  2 provides an easy  method of visu-
alizing short-run tenure arrangements.  For the
individual  depicted  by the demand  curve la-
beled LL1L2,  the decision  to rent in land  re-
quires that the market rental rate be less than
Wo,  while renting out land requires  w to exceed
wo.  In the  region  wo  to  w* the  farmer  farms
part of his land and rents the rest out; for rental
rates w* and larger, the farmer reverts to a pure
landlord and rents out his entire land holding.
U.S. Department of Agriculture  (USDA) data
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reveal that the bulk of large farmers  perceive
themselves as operating in markets with rental
rates less than w ,, where they farm all of their
own land  and rent in more land to  augment
their owned  land (see figure  1).  This  suggests
that the inability  to accumulate  (decumulate)
owned land instantaneously  leaves them in a
situation  where the owned land base does not
allow them to operate as they would prefer in
the  long run.  The  existence  of a land  rental
market permits them  to alleviate  their short-
run problem.  It  facilitates  short-term  adjust-
ments  necessitated  by  the  fact  that  farmers
cannot  instantaneously  augment  land  stock.
This function of the rental market is important
and  should  be  emphasized  because  it  is  the
existence  of an  active rental  market for  land
(temporary trade in land inventories) that dif-
ferentiates the land accumulation problem (and
other problems where capital rental is possible)
from the standard  capital accumulation mod-
el.
Beyond  explaining rental  behavior relative
to the price of rental land,  figure  2  also offers
insight as to why certain farmers faced with a
given  w  will rent in land while  other farmers
will rent out land. In terms of our model there
are two natural explanations  for  such behav-
ior: the first revolves around the existing stock
of land owned by the farmer; and the second
involves technological and entrepreneurial dif-
ferences  as  summarized by  the parameter  0.
Let  us  start  with  differences  in land  endow-
ment  and  consider  a farmer  identical  to the
one whose demand curve is given by LL1L2 in
all respects except that he has a lower endow-
ment of land (1i). Assuming  owned and rental
land are relatively close substitutes in the pro-
duction  process,  this  individual's  demand
curve can be depicted by something like LL 1L2.
Accordingly, at any rental rate this farmer will
always  tend  to rent  in (rent  out) more  (less)
land  than  the  original  farmers  considered.
Again  the  intuition  is  fairly  obvious.  Both
farmers are identical in all respects except their
owned land endowment.  The farmer with the
lower  land  endowment  tends  to compensate
for  the  inability  to adjust  owned land stocks
instantaneously by renting more land. It is also
interesting to note that differences in land en-
dowment can be a key determinant of whether
a farmer rents in or rents out land. For in the
region  woW  the  original farmer  is renting out
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Figure 2.  Individual rental land demands
Similar arguments apply to the parameter 0
introduced  earlier.  At this  point it  is conve-
nient to identify it with entrepreneurial ability;
later  we  shall use  it as  an  index  of technical
change.  Interpreting  0) as  an index  of entre-
preneurial ability it is plausible to believe that,
ceteris paribus, farmers with  a high 0 will be
able to earn a higher return on the margin from
a unit of rental land than a farmer with a low
O. Again the analytic argument is very similar
to  that  developed  above.  Considering  two
farmers who are identical in all respects except
for entrepreneurial ability, the farmer with the
greater ability could have a demand curve like
LL1L2 while the one with lower ability would
be  something like LL 1L2. Thus, at any rental
price  the  farmer  with  greater entrepreneurial
ability will tend to rent in more land than the
farmer with the lower entrepreneurial  ability.
The tendency to rent in more land as entre-
preneurial ability rises is easily explained and
likely  provides  a  key  determinant  of tenure
choice. Farmers with a given stock of land have
two alternatives  in the short  run:  farm it di-
rectly or rent it out.  In the  long run they can
sell  off  any  undesired  land  holding  as  their
preference structure dictates.  The opportunity
cost of farming the land is the going rental rate,
and  farmers  with  a  low degree  of entrepre-
neurial ability will see this opportunity cost as
relatively high, thus encouraging them to rent
out the land.
An obvious,  but important,  implication  of
Chambers and Phipps








Figure 3.  Temporary equilibrium rental price
determination
this discussion is that at any time the individ-
ual's land holdings (li)  are determined  by the
initial land endowment (li)  and expressions (5)
and  (6).  Thus,  the individual's  land  holding
depends  upon preferences.  This  finding high-
lights  the central  role  preferences  and  entre-
preneurial  ability  play  in determining  an in-
dividual's  tenure  position.  To  see this  point,
consider the  simple example  of two individ-
uals starting with the same initial land endow-
ment but with different  preference  structures
and  differing  entrepreneurial  abilities.  More-
over,  assume  that  the  individual  with  the
greater  entrepreneurial  ability  derives  fewer
nonpecuniary  benefits  from  land  ownership
than the other individual. Then, it seems likely
that at any  point in time the individual with
the lower degree of entrepreneurial ability will
have accumulated  more land  than the  other
individual simply because his preference struc-
ture dictates such an accumulation pattern. But
previous results also suggest that this individ-
ual will rent out more  land than the other be-
cause he owns more land but has a lower degree
of entrepreneurial  ability. Hence, the individ-
ual's  preferences  drive  this  person  to  accu-
mulate  land,  but  his  ability  (inability)  as  a
farmer forces him into the position of a land-
lord.
The foregoing  arguments  suggest  a natural
mechanism for determing and interpreting the
rental price of land. The market rental rate can
be  interpreted  as  that  rate  which  clears  the
market for temporary trades in land invento-
ries given other market prices, the distribution
of entrepreneurial ability, and the distribution
of the current stock of land. Pictorially,  it can
be  depicted  as  in  figure  3, where  the  curve
LL 1L2 represents  an appropriately  aggregated
demand curve for individuals whose aggregate
endowment is  11,  while  LL1L2 is the  negative
of an appropriately  aggregated  demand curve
for individuals whose aggregate endowment is
1 °. Market equilibrium  is given  by the  rental
rate  w*,  and individuals  aggregated  in LL 1L2
tend to rent in land rented out by individuals
aggregated in LL1L2.
From the above, it should be apparent that
the general form of an equilibrium rental price
equation must be
W*  =  W*(li,  1°,  V ,  0 °),
where  0 and 0°  are parameters  reflecting the
entrepreneurial  abilities  of individuals  aggre-
gated in LL1L2 and LL1L2. Hence, to portray
accurately  rental  price  behavior in  the  short
run, one must know the way in which the cur-
rent  stock of farmland is distributed,  the dis-
tribution of entrepreneurial  abilities,  and
product  prices  (which  in any  case  are  likely
jointly dependent).
Consumption  and Rental Dynamics
The dynamic behavior of the  system is effec-
tively characterized by expressions  (5) and (6).
However,  earlier developments  show that the
level  of consumption  depends upon the shad-
ow price of land and the current stock of owned
land.  Hence, dynamic changes  in either q or 11
are associated with intertemporal adjustments
in c. From (3),  it follows for constant a that
(13)  c =  [q - a(02u/lcll)ll]/a(2u/ac2).
By our assumptions on u(c, li), increases in the
growth of the shadow price of land slow down
the  pace  of consumption,  while  increases  in
land accumulation enhance consumption. The
intuition  is again simple.  As  q rises, land be-
comes more attractive to the farmer as an as-
set; hence, he tends to shift his income stream
toward  greater  land  accumulation  and  less
consumption.  On the other hand, increases in
11  are associated  with income growth  and de-
clining marginal  utility of owned land which
tends to increase consumption.
Using (8)  and  (10)  yields,  under  static  ex-
pectations,
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(14) /  all  +  * 281,1  0'
which implies that growth of rentals is nega-
tively associated with growth in ownership of
land.  Again the intuition is  simple: if owned
and rented land are close substitutes, the growth
of land ownership tends to reduce the produc-
tion opportunities for rental land. If we  let L
= 11 +  12,  i.e., total farm size, we obtain when
0= 0,
rented land  to owned land.  It is  particularly
interesting to see what happens to 4  when tech-
nology changes  or when the other parameters
of the system change. In general, however, this
requires explicit knowledge about the third de-
rivatives of the farmer's income function.  Be-
cause such information  is hard to come by in
most economic instances, attention is restrict-
ed to the case where ~  is a constant. Such would
be the case ifn were quadratic in 1i  and 12,  i.e.,
(17) II =  II*(v,  0) + Q(11,  12,  v),
(15) L=-  1  +  -ll,
and by previous arguments we  see that L  <  li
so long  as there  is  no  change  in 0.  Because
changes  in  0  can  be  identified  with  either
changes  in entrepreneurial  ability or technol-
ogy and our model  has no  way of predicting
such  changes,  we  shall  presume  that  the in-
dividual farmer  perceives  0  =  0 and confine
our analysis of e to the comparative dynamic
experiment that is carried out at the end of the
paper. Total farm size has to grow slower than
outright land acquisition if owned and rental
land  are  close  enough  substitutes.  In  fact,  if
owned and rented land are perfect substitutes,
expression (15) equals zero. This follows since
any  accumulation  of owned  land leads to  an
exact opposite movement in rental land when
owned  and rental land are perfect  substitutes
because their marginal  profitabilities must be
identical  and equal to the rental price of land.
Acquisition of owned land, then,  forces down
the marginal profitability of all land so that the
farmer  must rent in  less land to restore  equi-
librium.
An  interesting  aspect of (15)  is that it  says
the system does not need to be a steady state
for overall  farm  size (L) to stop growing.  Of
course, if the system  is in a steady  state farm
size  growth is zero  since  1i =  0 in the steady




which implies that owned and rental land are
locally perfect  substitutes for one another.
Expression  (14) can be rewritten
a/i  (lw,  ),
where n*  is a general numeric function and Q
is  the  general  quadratic  function.  Technical
change  as  represented  in  (17)  is particularly
tractable analytically because it does not affect
the rate at which 12  is utilized since expression
(8) can now be written aQ/1l2 = w.
The Steady State
One of the key questions  this paper  seeks  to
address  is, what makes  the farmer  stop accu-
mulating land for ownership? This can be re-
phrased  as asking  when  the dynamic  system
depicted by (5) and (6) will be at rest.  By  (5)
and  (6)  the  steady  state  is  characterized  by




· H° a--  =  ln(/l,  12, V, 0)
dq
- wl2  - c = 0,  and
OH°  du
rq-  = rq-~
all  4  1
q an
a al,
when the  rental constraint is not binding.
In what follows it is assumed that there ex-
ists a unique solution  to (18)  and (19)  which
we denote by (Ir, q-). As stated earlier,  under
the assumption of a unique state, the assump-
tions guarantee  that a stable path  converging
to (1v,  qu)  and consistent with  (3)-(7) will be
optimal.  From  (18)  and  (19), the farmer  will
stop acquiring new land when his preferences
are such that consumption  exactly  equals  in-
come, and when
Q(ral-l)  au
T~~~~o'~l' where ~ is the partial adjustment coefficient  of
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i.  - n
=  0
I  t  I ' S  1  1o
Stock of Owned  Land
I1  I1
Stock of  Owned  Land
Figure 4.  Adjustment to the steady state
which in turn implies that in the  steady state,
I air
r  >  -
a al,
i.e.,  the  discount  rate  is  greater  than the  in-
stantaneous  rate  of return  on funds  invested
in land. Normally,  one  might expect  the  dis-
count rate to be equal to the instantaneous rate
of return on funds invested  in land
But this only takes into account the pecuniary
returns  from  owning  land.  Since  the farmer
derives psychic as well as pecuniary returns, it
makes sense that there should be a gap between
the  discount  rate  and  the  rate  of return  on
funds invested in land. Put rather imprecisely,
this implies that the farmer accumulates  land
past the point where his opportunity cost and
instantaneous rate of return are equal. Hence,
we  can  say that  the  farmer  continues  to  ac-
cumulate  land until he reaches  a point where
his marginal pecuniary losses from holding land
are proportional to his marginal psychic gains
from owning  land.  This implication  is tested
in the empirical section of this paper by com-
paring  rates  of return  on  farmland  to  rates
earned on comparable long-term investments.
Typically,  we will  be  interested  in  charac-
terizing the dynamic behavior of the model in
the neighborhood of  the steady state. The most
appropriate conceptual  tool for this is a phase
Figure  5.  Dynamic  effects  of changes  in the
discount rate
diagram. To start we need to know how q and




aOll,  10  a2Ho/d  q2
Ho is convex in  q and concave  in 1i by usual
results  in optimization  theory  (from the  suf-
ficiency conditions). Hence, minus the denom-
inator in  (20)  is negative.  Direct  calculation
establishes
(21)
d2H°  I [Or  dr d_2*
dqdl,  adl,  l  dl2  l,
- w  12 l  ,  -
a  i  1r  ac*  1
a  -all  all-J
Expression  (21)  is ambiguous  in sign,  but  a
moment's  reflection  will  establish  that  it  is
plausible  to think of (21)  as negative.  To see
this,  approximate  the optimal  adjustment  in
owned land  linearly  around  the  steady  state
v1  to obtain
(22)




where /l:  represents  the steady-state  value.  A
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(24) all
We  assume  both  (23)  and  (24)  hold.  Direct
calculation yields
(25) dq  d2Ho/dlq
all  ,=O r- d2Ho/dlldq
d2Ho/dl
2
r - 62 HO/dqdl,
If H° is twice continuously  differentiable,  our
assumptions imply (20) is positive and (25) is
negative, so the phase system is as depicted in
figure  4.
Changes in the Discount  Rate
Using  earlier  developments  direct  computa-
tion reveals
q  I  a2H°o
ar =A  -dqdl  < 0,




o 2Ho  d
2Ho
Lq 2 0l2  aqal,
.(r  8;HO)]
q-  is the steady-state value of  the co-state vari-
able, and I1 is the steady-state value of owned
land. These results say that an increase  in the
discount  rate  leads  to  a lower  ownership  of
farmland in the very long run.  The dynamics
of the adjustment are best visualized with the
aid of figure 5. The original,  long-run equilib-
rium is at (1 °, qO). A change in the discount rate
has no effect on the long-run budget constraint
and only affects the rate of adjustment in q. A
rise in r shifts the q = 0 locus back toward the
origin  as illustrated.  In the  very first instant,
the  level of land ownership  is predetermined
so  that the  instantaneous  adjustment  of the
system is to jump to point B on the new con-
vergent  path.  Since 11  is  constant,  this  is ac-
complished  by  an  instantaneous  decrease  in
savings to reflect the fact that the value of cur-
rent consumption  vis-d-vis the  future benefit
stream  from  owned  land  has increased.  Put
another way, the relative value of savings has
declined and  the farmer  responds by cutting
back on savings.  After  the instantaneous  ad-
justments had been  made the farmer is oper-
ating in a  region where  optimal behavior re-
quires  a  reduction  in  land  holdings,  and  he
adjusts along the stable path to the new steady
state (1v,  qu). Hence,  the farmer sells some  of
his  land  but  simultaneously  increases  the
amount of land that he rents in. Basically, he
rents  in  land  because  he  currently  does  not
have an optimal long-run stock of owned land
(recall previous discussion).  This forces short-
run adjustments  in rental behavior  to insure
production efficiency.  At the same time, how-
ever, as he moves along the stable path toward
(1v,  qu), 11  falls but q rises so the farmer tends
to cut back consumption.
Technical  Change
In general,  it is not possible to determine un-
ambiguously what happens for general changes
in the technology as characterized  by shifts in
0. If, however, the technology is of the general
form of (17), then
dq  I [adr* 1  d2Ho  and
o  a  oL  a  and
all  1  1  aHod \ dar
ad  A  r  T  - ll,/  d
Accordingly, if technical change is progressive
(dhrt/O > 0), the long-run shadow price of land
falls while land ownership rises in the long run.
The  dynamics  of the adjustment process  are
illustrated in figure 6. The original steady state
is again (1°, q0). The instantaneous impact of a
technical  improvement  is  to  enhance  the
farmer's income stream, which translates into
an instantaneous  consumption  increase.  This
is illustrated by the movement from the orig-
inal steady  state to a point like B on the new
convergent  path. Along  the convergent  path,
the farmer continuously  accumulates land be-
cause long-run desired land holdings have ris-
en from  1° to 1.  At the same time,  however,
he rents in less land.  Furthermore, for certain
farmers  there is  the  possibility  that  such  an
adjustment process will include a switch from
a tenant to a landlord position as the result of
technical change. At the same time, the size of
the  farm operation  as measured  by L  grows
but at a less rapid rate than land ownership if
owned and  rented land are  imperfect  substi-
tutes. As the farmer converges to his long-run
equilibrium, he also expands consumption be-
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Table  2.  Regression  Results
western States 1949-84
for  Five  Mid-
I1  I-  I1
Stock  of Owned  Land
Figure 6.  Dynamic  effects  of technical change
cause the advent of technical  change enhances
the farmer's intertemporal income  stream. In
passing,  one might note that figure  6 can also
be  interpreted  as  a representation  of the dif-
ferences  between  the  intertemporal  accumu-
lation patterns of farmers with differing entre-
preneurial  ability. With this type of difference
in entrepreneurial ability, the farmer with the
greater ability will always end up accumulating
more  land  in the  long run  regardless  of the
original land endowment.
Empirical Evidence
A primary implication  of these results is that,
contrary  to  an  efficient  markets  hypothesis,
systematic  difference  should emerge  between
rates  of return on farmland and  rates earned
on other long-term investments. Moreover, our
findings  suggest  that  these  systematic  differ-
ences  should be  related  to the state  of tech-
nology, entrepreneurial ability, and individual
farmer  preference  for owning  land.  Although
it would be very  difficult to test the effect  of
the  later  two  elements  on  rate  of return  to
farmland because of difficulties  in measuring
either entrepreneurial  ability  or farmer  pref-
erence,  a direct test of the effects  of the state
of technology  is  relatively  easy  to  construct
under plausible assumptions.
To test the hypothesis that the state of tech-
nology has systematic influence  on the rental
and  accumulation  decision  and  hence  upon
rates  of return to  farmland,  we assume  that
changes  in technology shift nI(l,  12,  v, O)  over
time.  Simply put,  0 is taken  as a time index.
Time
State  Intercept  Trend  R2 F
Ohio  .17  -. 008  .51  32.8
(6.06)a  (-5.72)
Indiana  .18  -. 008  .42  23.4
(5.47)  (-4.84)
Illinois  .15  -. 007  .38  19.3
(4.72)  (-4.40)
Iowa  .18  -. 007  .36  18.4
(5.02)  (-4.29)
Missouri  .22  -. 01  .66  61.2
(9.15)  (-7.84)
aNumbers  in parentheses  are  t-statistics  for  the  null  hypothesis
that the parameter is zero.
Then,  to test our hypothesis,  we need  to  de-
termine whether there is a systematic relation-
ship between  the state  of technology,  rate  of
return on farmland, and rates of return on al-
ternative investments.  A first step is to ascer-
tain  if there  is  a statistically  detectable  rela-
tionship  between  the  difference  between  the
rates of return on farmland and alternative in-
vestments. Empirically, this was accomplished
by regressing the difference  between  the total
rate of return on farmland (defined as the ratio
of cash rents to land price plus percentage  cap-
ital  gains)  and the twelve-month  Federal  In-
termediate Credit Bank (FICB) loan rate against
a time trend for five midwestern states for the
period 1949-84.3 All land price and rental data
are from  Jones  and Barnard.  The results  are
reported  in  table  2.  Midwestern  states  were
purposely  chosen to insure that factors unre-
lated to farming or the farm way of life,  such
as rapid expansion  on the rural  urban  fringe
and industrial  development,  would not have
an undue influence on land prices.
The results in table 2 indicate  that the null
hypothesis  (that the difference between  these
rates of return is unrelated to the state of tech-
nology)  can  be rejected at the  .01  level for all
five  states.  The  results  also indicate  that the
difference  between  these  rates  of return  has
experienced a markedly similar secular decline
in each  state.  In  each  state,  the total rate  of
return on farmland exceeded the twelve-month
3 Although  the theoretical  analysis  takes a as constant,  for any
reasonable time series this presumption is implausible. Therefore,
our empirical analysis is predicted on the presumption that farmers
accurately  forecast their actual capital gain.
q
I
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FICB loan rate at the beginning of the sample
and was lower than that same rate at the end
of the sample. In terms of our model, this sug-
gests  that in the  early  1950s  there  was room
for farmland  investment that was sound on a
purely pecuniary basis, while at the end of the
sample the  driving  force for land investment
seemed to be nonpecuniary benefits. Of course,
alternative  hypotheses  could  likely  explain
these results as well as our own. For example,
consideration of risk factors and erroneous ex-
pectations  by farmers could  partially  explain
these results  in the  sense  that they could  ac-
count  for differences  between a plausible  dis-
count rate and the total rate of return on farm-
land. But they would be hard pressed to account
for the systematic  relationship  uncovered  in
table 2 without an explicit recognition of tech-
nical change.  In  any case,  the  fact that alter-
native explanations exist for these phenomena
really means  that each  potentially has some-
thing to  offer  in  explaining  phenomena  that
have  long puzzled  agricultural  economists.  A
direction for future research would be a thor-
ough investigation of the relative explanations.
Another  interesting  aspect  of our results is
that they suggest that technical change in these
five midwestern  states has tended to diminish
the rate of return to farmland relative  to the
twelve-month  FICB loan  rates. That is,  tech-
nical  change  has made  it  systematically  less
profitable  to invest in farmland than in alter-
native investments. This raises the question of
whether investment in agricultural technology
may have exceeded a socially optimal rate. Of
course,  this  hypothesis  cannot  be  vigorously
defended on the basis of such casual empirical
analysis, but the issue merits further discussion
especially because  so much  research  into  ag-
ricultural  technology  is  carried  on  at  public
expense.
Conclusion
A farmer's  choices  of tenure  and  size  of op-
erating unit result from a complex interplay of
technology, entrepreneurial  capacity, and per-
sonal preferences.  By examining these choices
in a dynamic optimization framework,  it was
possible to determine the qualitative effects of
many of these explanatory factors. The rate of
land accumulation  was shown to be positively
related to the nonpecuniary  benefits of farm-
land  ownership,  certain  types  of progressive
technical  change, and negatively related to the
discount  rate. In a steady state (zero land ac-
cumulation), the farmer's rate of return on land
was found to be less than the discount rate if
farmland  ownership  conveys  nonpecuniary
benefits.  The  amount  of land  rented  in was
negatively related to the land endowment,  the
opportunity cost of the farm operator, and the
market rental rate and positively related to en-
trepreneurial ability and progressive technical
change.
The rental market for farmland was  shown
to function in a short-run equilibrating  capac-
ity, analogous to the role played by the markets
for stocks of agricultural commodities. The ex-
istence of an active rental market differentiates
farmland  accumulation  from  the  traditional
capital accumulation problem. The short-run,
equilibrium rental rate for farmland was shown
to depend  on the distributions of the current
farmland  stock,  entrepreneurial  ability,  and
market prices.
An empirical test provided support for one
implication  of  the  theoretical  model  that
changes in technology should cause systematic
differences to be observed between rates of re-
turn  on farmland  and  rates  earned  on com-
parable  long-term  assets.  For the  five  mid-
western  states  studied,  technological  change
was also found to reduce  the rate of return to
farmland relative  to the twelve-month  FICB
loan rate over the period  1949-84.
Other implications  are generally  supported
by observed trends in farm tenure. The dom-
inance of the part-owner operator in the large
commercial  farm  category (fig.  1) seems con-
sistent with the positive relation  between en-
trepreneurial ability and the amount of rented
land if farm  size is an indication of entrepre-
neurial  ability.  The  observed  monotonic  in-
creases  over time  in both owned  and rented
land  by part-owner  operators  (table  1) is ex-
plainable  as  a series of short-run  adjustments
to a rising optimal size of operating unit. While
Harrington  et al. note that average farm  size
appears to have stabilized,  this does not nec-
essarily  imply the farm  sector  is in  a steady
state.  An alternative  explanation  of this phe-
nomenon is that the farm sector in the aggre-
gate is approximately at a point where owned
and rented land are perfect substitutes.
[Received May 1987; final revision
received September 1988.]
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